What are radical beliefs

Radical Constructivism

Understanding as a Construction pp 44-127 | Cite as

Part of the Konzeption Empirische Literaturwissenschaft book series (KEL, volume 16)

Summary

If one intends to establish a new paradigm of scientific research or even philosophical thinking, one must consider, among other things, the means by which the scientific community can be convinced of the necessity and correctness of this project. Perhaps Luhmann's reference to this question may help, who advises for unprovable or difficult to prove assertions: “to reinforce the assertion communicatively” (Luhmann, 1988a, 7). In history, virtue has become ‘true virtue’, natural fruits ’have recently been offered for sale, and politics are now finally calling for real reforms’. In the course of this semantic reinforcement, shouldn't the term 'radical constructivism' also contain the sense that what 'constructivism' has always meant is being stylized into a new, 'radical' theory that obeys the laws of modern advertising campaigns rather than that you name new scientific and philosophical problems and (maybe) solve them? There is no question that ‘radical constructivism’ has become the “last fashion in epistemology” (ibid.), But the question remains whether this speaks for or against it. Does ‘radical constructivism’ - beyond its radical designation - offer something fundamentally new with regard to epistemological problems?

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Literature

  1. Kant, 1787, 274-279.Google Scholar
  2. On the problem of the a priori in the constructivist paradigm, see Roth, 1986a, 20f. : ”From my point of view, the a priori problem presents itself as follows: There are a priori of perception and knowledge: they are the schemes according to which the brain internally orders and interprets sensory perceptions, which are chaotic and meaningless. ... The genesis of the a priori forms of intuition and knowledge is a self-explicative spiral process. “The a priori is therefore only a special case of the self-explication of our cognitive system, not an ontological, non-evasive and unchangeable quantity. Google Scholar
  3. Cf. e.g. Pasternack, 1986, 154: “The focus of philosophical aesthetics as a non-empirical science is the justification or justification of aesthetic criteria. “Google Scholar
  4. Cf. also Schmidt, 1986, 179: “With such a model (the constructivist epistemology, M. F.) ideas of a prioris and ultimate justifications are not compatible." See also Glasersfeld (1986). See also the discussion of the change in the epistemological question further in my work in Section 5.1.1.Google Scholar
  5. That it is necessary - also in the opinion of the representatives of the NELW - is evident from Schmidt's answer to the question formulated in the title: “Can an empirical aesthetic get by without a philosophical foundation?” (Schmidt, 1986, 175). “An empirical aesthetic without a philosophy is not possible” (ibid.). Google Scholar
  6. From the constructivist point of view, this also applies to idealistic aesthetic concepts, such as Hegel's, who thought of formulating eternal aesthetic principles with the terms totality, independence and particularity, and also to Pasternack, who tries to take over these prince. See Pasternack (1986). Google Scholar
  7. Cf. also Schmidt, 1987b, 12: “The processes of self-reference and self-organization have proven to be fundamental to the development of a constructivist epistemology. “The current boom in these concepts can undoubtedly be proven in many places. Here is just one example: “Self-organization seems to be becoming a new paradigm that unites the individual sciences - there is talk of a turning point in thinking and a new science” (Dress / Hendrichs / Küppers, 1986,7). Google Scholar
  8. Not only the construction, but even the ‘invention ’of reality has become a catchphrase in the context of constructivism, or at least the title of a book. See Watzlawick (ed.), 1981. Google Scholar
  9. The reality-creating processes of the system of literary scholars and critics will be discussed in detail later; the discussion of the brain as a self-organizing system will be the topic in the section on the neurological foundations of constructivism.Google Scholar
  10. For a further discussion of the concept of self-reference and that of autopoiesis in the context of ‘Developments in systems theory’, see also Luhmann (1988) .Google Scholar
  11. "Luhmann does not see this replacement of the concept of nature’ by the improbability ’as a paradigm shift, as which the radical constructivists sell their new worldview, but as“ nothing less than the adaptation of science to modern society. . . "(Luhmann, 1987, 43). Google Scholar
  12. Cf. also Köck, 1983, 46: “... the logic we have acquired with its rigid concepts of ‘identity’ and its merely two-valued true ’- false’ - semantics proves to be a highly special logic among countless others ”(emphasis in the text). Google Scholar
  13. Cf. also Luhmann, 1984, 648: “... that self-reference is not a property of consciousness, but occurs in the world of experience.” Google Scholar
  14. Luhmann refers here to Watzlawick (eds.), (1981), Maturana (1982), Richards / Glasersfeld (1984) and Rusch (1986). On one of the conceptions of Luhmann and Maturana see also Krüll / Luhmann / Maturana (1987) .Google Scholar
  15. The representatives of Radical Constructivism and the NELW have sporadic brief statements on Derrida and ‘Deconstruction’. E.g. in Schmidt, 1986a, 17f. or in Hauptmeier / Schmidt (1985), where the “deconstructionist approach (s) ... not their anarchist attitude” (131) is held up, but the “neo-Darwinist values” (ibid.) and the “leveling of the Difference between primary and secondary literature ”(ibid.) Are subject to criticism. For a systematic comparison of the two concepts, see now Schmidt (1988a). Schmidt summarizes deconstructivist approaches under the keyword discourse theory ’and assesses their position overall as follows:“ While the front position of the discourse theorists against structuralist positions is clearly recognizable ..., the dissociation of hermeneutic positions remains rather ambiguous. The discourse-theoretical renunciation of explicit theories (be it intended or not) and the empiricalization of at least central discourse-theoretical concepts leads to old problems being carried on in formulations that are often difficult to understand (such as the question of author, text, meaning, interpretation, concept of literature) and new central ones Concepts, above all the term discourse, are used so vaguely that they give rise to all kinds of metaphorical uses and interpretations ”(Schmidt, 1988a, 134). A detailed study of the similarities and differences between deconstructivists and hermeneutists is available from Gumbrecht (1986). It is interesting to which ‘third position’ Gumbrecht refers at the end of his essay: “This‘ third position ’, which under names like Constructivism’ or Systems Theory ’is apparently difficult to adapt against the background of German thought tradition Pluralization of realities and lifestyles produces can be seen as a new relationship of Complementarity between the subject-related and society-oriented secondary demythization ”(Gumbrecht, 1986, 32f.; italics i. T.). Google Scholar
  16. See Glasersfeld, who as a ‘radical constructivist’ finally breaks with ‘metaphic realism’: “The radical constructivist has renounced‘ metaphysical realism ’once and for all” (Glasersfeld, 1981, 23). Google Scholar
  17. Cf. Glasersfeld (1979), who notes that - despite Kant's radical criticism - naive realism, apart from physics at the beginning of the 20th century, has maintained itself in the individual sciences to this day. ". .. ’knowledge’ is conceived as the knower’s representation of things and events ‘in themselves’ as they are supposed to exist in a ‘real’ world, i.e. a world that is thought to be prior to and independent of the knower’s cognizing activity. This was the general view before Kant, and, in spite of his well-founded reservations, it still is the general view among psychologists and the bulk of other scientists. The one significant exception are the great physicists during the first third of this century, demolished the naive realism of classical science and revolutionized the physicist’s picture of the universe "(Glasersfeld, 1979, 110). Google Scholar
  18. Cf. also the following formulation of this fact in Luhmann (1987): “This position (that of the cognitive foundation, M.F.) was last called subject’ after God had cleared it. This requires a dignified additional assumption that man can take this position and "base" himself (or his consciousness) on the world "(Luhmann, 1987, 37) .Google Scholar
  19. Cf. e.g. Habermas (1985), who reduced the dem philosophical discourse of modernity ’(and postmodernism) to subject-philosophical core assumptions that were merely renamed with the label paradigm of understanding’. Google Scholar
  20. See also Glasersfeld, 1987, 439: “. .. one of the basic concepts of radical constructivism: the concept of Adaptation. Whether it is 'knowledge' or 'knowledge', scientific theories, the meaning of words or quite simply what we call 'understanding', in all of these apparently different contexts it is ... about Viability " (Emphasis added). However, see also Luhmann's criticism of Glasersfeld's "concept of adaptation": "Knowledge is ... not in any" arbitrary ", but only in one for it suitable Environment possible. However, this does not entitle us to conclude from this that the knowledge is "adapted" to reality "(Luhmann, 1988a, 37). In a footnote, Luhmann Glasersfeld assumes this fallacy, "which radically deradicalizes his (Glasersfelds, M.F.) Radical constructivism" (op. In my opinion, there is no criticism, since Gasersfeld's concept of viability always relates to the activity of the knowing subject and must never be understood as an ‘adaptation’ to an ontologically given reality.Google Scholar
  21. Glasersfeld also explains the terminological contrast between agree ’and fit’ with a translation into English. ‘Match’ is used to state that the & # x00DF figure reproduces what is shown; In contrast, fit ’means that e.g. a key fits into a lock, which says nothing about the lock, but something about the key. Google Scholar
  22. Cf. Glasersfeld, 1981, 22: “The environment can at best be made responsible for extinction, but not for survival. “Cf. also Roth, 1986, 167:“. .., for the organism to survive, it is sufficient that it fulfills the minimum functional requirements for its autopoietic organization. “With this interpretation of the theory of evolution, the proponents of radical constructivism differ fundamentally from the proponents of evolutionary epistemology. See Glasersfeld's demarcation against Konrad Lorenz (Glasersfeld, 1981, 22, footnote) or against Campbell (Glasersfeld, 1985, 16f.): ”. .. Campbell builds an epistemology on variation, selection and adaptation, but then in the end contradicts the evolutionary principle by demanding that knowledge not only fit into reality, but also recognize this reality through a kind of cognitive reflection. " See also Roth's criticism of Vollmer in Roth (1986a). Sociobiology is also criticized: “... today, within the framework of sociobiology, the serious logical mistake is often made to present selection as the effective cause of evolution” (Glasersfeld, 1985, 13). To problematize the concept of adaptation in dertionary epistemology from a 'constructionist' standpoint, see the study by Engels (1989) with the questioning title: 'Knowledge as adaptation?' And the balanced answer: “Possibly also, but not only” (Engels, 1989 , 382). Google Scholar
  23. See also Glasersfeld, 1987, 404: “... that constructivism never speaks about ontology. Constructivism deals only with knowledge, the cognitive, the pure epistemology. ”Google Scholar
  24. Cf. also Glasersfeld, 1981, 23: “So radical constructivism is above all because of this radicalBecause it breaks convention and develops an epistemology in which knowledge no longer relates to an "objective", ontological reality, but exclusively to the order and organization of experiences in the world of our experience ”(emphasis added). Google Scholar
  25. Cf. the remark by Schmidt, 1987b, 40: “Of course (i.e. after all human experience) Radical Constructivism is not a brand new theory that has fallen from heaven - if it were, we could neither understand nor deal with it. “A similar argument should also be decisive for the fact that paradigm shifts in the sense of Kuhn can only be seen in retrospect. It seems all the more astonishing to me that the radical constructivists and representatives of the NELW are almost supposed to talk about a paradigm shift (or are just now being noticed). How can the Radical Constructivists grasp a "new" paradigm? Google Scholar
  26. See, for example, Democritus, who stated “that we cannot see how each one really is thing procured or not procured. “(In: Capelle, 4 Wilhelm: Die Vorsokratiker, Stuttgart, 1953, fragment 10, p.437). Google Scholar
  27. Cf. Glasersfeld, 1985,4: “... nobody will ever be able to compare the perception of an object with the postulated object itself, which is said to have caused the perception. “Google Scholar
  28. Cf. Glasersfeld, 1984, 8: “In my opinion, it is the tragedy of Western epistemology that it started from the very understandable but nonsensical assumption that what I know is already there.” Google Scholar
  29. Cf. Glasersfeld, 1984, 8: “For me, epistemology is the question of knowledge in the sense of how I create knowledge and what I can and cannot regard as good and useful knowledge. “Cf. also the above-quoted statement by Schmidt, 1986, 178:“ The epistemological key question is no longer: What is knowledge? But: How do we acquire knowledge? ” Likewise Hauptmeier, who states that “the new epistemological question: How do we recognize and know? ... has taken the place of the traditional question of the validity and objectivity of knowledge ... ”(Hauptmeier, 1986, 20; emphasis placed on Kant's question: 'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' must certainly be called a 'constructivist' question with which he did not aim at empirical knowledge but at the transcendental conditions of empirical knowledge. For further discussion see section 5.1.1.Google Scholar
  30. Regarding Popkin, see the introduction, note 53.Google Scholar
  31. This is also proven, for example, by the brief analysis of the Vico reception in Burke, 1987, 7-17. Only the ‘New Science’ was received, which always resulted in the one-sided preoccupation with Vico as a philosopher of history. Burke is no exception. The main part of his brief book deals again with the New Science ’. For an overview of the Vico reception see also Otto, 1979,12f. : “Vico research has not always given this text (meaning 'De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia', MF) the weight that it can undoubtedly claim: Until recently it was exhausted in a questionable columnism, searched in Vico the apologist of a 'common sense' of language that has not yet been misguided by the Enlightenment and likes to overlook the philosopher struggling with Descartes and the problems of systematic justification of knowledge. “Google Scholar
  32. The translation by Otto / Viechtbauer reads: “Just as divine truth is that which God, in that he recognizes, arranges and generates it, so human truth is that which man, while he is gaining knowledge of him, combines and at the same time creates: in this way science becomes a knowledge of the way or the modality in which the sur comes into being ... ”(Vico, 1979,37). Glasersfeld adds to his translation the assessment that Vico used the der operation ’in the same sense as it was understood by the pragmatists, operationalists and constructivists of our century, namely Dewey, Bridgman and Piaget.Google Scholar
  33. This would be the position of the realistic ’scientist who thinks that he has wrested the laws of nature from the world.Google Scholar
  34. Cf. also Glasersfeld, 1987 404: “... if we have some time know, then we can very well distinguish between what we call real and what we call fictional or illusory or hallucinative. ... what we then call reality ... is based on the agreements we have made. “Google Scholar
  35. Cf. also the following Glasersfelds on the relationship between constructivism and reality: “... that constructivism never denies or denies reality - ontic reality - that it only says that all my statements about this reality are one hundred percent my experience are ”(Glasersfeld, 1987a, 7). Google Scholar
  36. The generally affirmative attitude of the Radical Constructivists towards Vico and Kant, despite all the differences, is documented, for example, by the following quote: “... Radical Constructivism ... (brings) more and more empirical evidence for G.Vico's and I. Kant's insight ... that we never deal with reality as such, but always with our realities of experience (Schmidt, 1987a, 7) .Google Scholar
  37. Cf. e.g. Böhme, 1986, 14: “... (Kant's) epistemology is constitutional theory, it accounts for how a formation of nature takes place in the knowledge of nature at the same time.” Google Scholar
  38. For the documentation of ‘constructivism’ in Kant, see, for example, the following famous passage: “... that reason only sees what it produces itself according to its drafts” (Kant, 1787, XIII) .Google Scholar
  39. The term ‘transcendental’ is also defined by Kant in terms of the constructiveness of knowledge. “I call all knowledge transcendental that is not concerned with objects, but with our type of knowledge of objects, insofar as this should be possible a priori” (Kant, 1787,25; emphasis added). Glasersfeld comments: “In contemporary terms, such transcendental’ investigation is the study of the mental operations that we consider constitutive of rational cognition ”(Glasersfeld, 1982, 633). Google Scholar
  40. Criticism of the Kantian a priori based on ‘constructivist’ considerations can already be found in Dilthey: “Kant's a priori is rigid and dead; ... the real conditions of consciousness and its presuppositions, as I (Dilthey, MF) understand them, are a living historical process, are development, they have their own history, and the course of this history is their adaptation to the ever more precisely recognized diversity of the contents of sensation ”(Dilthey, 1982,44). Especially in his ‘Early Drafts on Epistemology and Logic’, Dilthey places the constructiveness of experiencing and experiencing at the center of his investigations.Google Scholar
  41. For similar efforts in the field of ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’, see the article by Engels (1985). Google Scholar
  42. A brief historical recollection seems to me remarkable in this context. K. Cramer points in his article ‘Experience, Experience’ (Cramer, 1972) to the origin of this term in Fichte's transcendental idealism. The experience is understood there as a unity of reality and life, as a state of reflectionless fulfillment: “This state is the basis and starting point of a (namely Fichtes, MF) transcendental theory of knowledge ... The ux00FC; life and experience given immediately is ... the ultimate for all theory ... ”(Cramer, 1972,703). The difference between Fichte's concept of experience and that of the radical constructivists is probably only in the natural isti cal ’safeguards of constructivists. With regard to the logical function of the concept of experience for a theory of knowledge, everything has already been said in Fichte.Google Scholar
  43. Cf. Glasersfeld, 1987, 404: “... it is a more epistemic Solipsism. But the epistemic ’must be emphasized” (emphasis added). Google Scholar
  44. Cf. the problematization of a coherence theory of epistemic justification in Bieri, 1987, 45f. : “An opinion is justified by the fact that it is part of a coherent system in which individual opinions are opposed to one another. But what does it mean that a system of opinions is "coherent"? And why is an opinion system, if it is coherent, epistemically justified by it? Can't there be several equally coherent systems of opinion ... ”(emphasis added). The discussion of a coherence theory of truth has been a defining theme in analytical philosophy for years.Google Scholar
  45. Cf. also Glasersfeld, 1981, 31: "Every constructivism begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place in the world of experience of a purposeful consciousness." In my opinion, this concept of zibigkeit can be compared with Hörmann's postulate of 'constancy of meaning' or with Piaget's assumption that every individual strives to achieve a state of equilibrium in the process of assimilation and accommodation To be patterns of behavior. See the explanations under 2.4 and in Chapter 4 of my work.Google Scholar
  46. The ability to distinguish and, on the basis of distinctions, to form invariants has recently been cited in many places as a fundamental cognitive operation. For example, Luhmann (1987, 39) and Foerster (1985, 25) cite the dictum of G.S. Brown: “Draw a distinction” (Brown, 1972,3). This ability is making a career for itself under the label of ‘Discrimination’ in the latest analytical philosophy: “To recognize something or to know something means something about something else distinguish to be able to. This is perhaps the most fundamental concept in our subject, and the ability to discriminate is the common thread that runs through the various varieties of cognition and knowledge ”(Bieri, 1987, 15; italics in the past). To explain this process, Glasersfeld refers to Wilhelm v. Humboldt: “In order to reflect, the mind must stand still for a moment in its progressive activity, grasp what has just been presented in a unity, and in this way, as an object, oppose itself. The units, which he can form several in this way, in turn compare with one another, and separates and connects them according to his needs ”(W. v. Humboldt: About Thinking and Spoken (1795/96), in: Werke, vol. 7 , 2, Berlin 1907, p.581). Finally, the decisive role that the concept of difference ’plays with the deconstructionists, especially with Derrida, should not go unmentioned. For an overview of deconstructivist ’thinking see Cull88) .Google Scholar
  47. The ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ may serve as an example again here. One must, however, be skeptical about the universality of this project prophesied by Riedel. The majority of biologists do not even know the ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ by name, its status as ‘prima philosophia’ also appears questionable at first. See Engels, 1989, 18f. Google Scholar
  48. Most of Maturana's work was written in the 1970s at the Biological Computer Laboratory (BCL) in Illinois. Selected works have been available in German translation since 1982 (see Maturana, 1982). In the following I will quote from the German edition. I will not go into the numerous summaries of Maturana’s thoughts by the representatives of the NELW.Google Scholar
  49. Cf. on this the establishment of autonomy and heteronomy of the organism as a leading question in Roth (1986) and the question formulated on the basis of the concept of autopoietic systems: “How can the brain, in its isolation from the world, generate a behavior that is its Organism and thus enables itself to survive? Who guarantees the correctness of the behavioral decision ”(Roth, 1985, 92)? "Autonomy and autopoiesis" is also the title of Varela (1987) .Google Scholar
  50. A well-known example of the subordination of the Indian to a plan defined by the species is probably Jacques Monod (1971). For a criticism of the theory of evolution see Maturana, 1982, 181: “. .. that evolutionary thinking, which to explain the dynamics of change places the main emphasis on the categories of diversity, reproduction and species, has prevented the necessary investigation of the autonomy of living beings as a prerequisite for an explanation of biological phenomena. ”Google Scholar
  51. The volumes by Hejl / Köck / Roth (ed.) 1978, Benseler / Hejl / Köck (ed.) 1980 and Roth / Schwegler (ed.) 1981 contributed to the first dissemination of this term in the FRG towards the end of the 1970s. To assess the effectiveness of this term, here is a quote from the introduction to the first volume: “MATURANA’s Biology of Cognition and his theory of ‘autopoietic systems’ - developed together with F.J.Varela - proves to be the first consistent empirical theory of cognition that is indeed self-referential, i.e. that explains itself, or, in other words, does not presuppose as evident, unproblematic, or already solved, what ‘explaining’ or ‘knowing’ etc. is or should be. MATURANA’s theory of autopoiesis explains (through itself) why it is possible ”(Benseler / Hejl / Köck, 1980a, 9; italics i.T.). In the meantime, the term is widely used in the context of radical constructivism and also within systems theory (e.g. Luhmann (1984), (1987), (. For the current assessment see Roth, 1987,256: “The Maturana essay 'Biology of Cognition ', created in 1970 as an internal paper of the' Biological Computer Laboratory 'in Urbana / Illinois and only made available to a larger circle of readers years later, is indeed an ingenious conception of the world and being, comparable only to Wittgenstein's' Tractatus logico- philosophicus', albeit pointing in a completely different direction. ”Google Scholar
  52. Cf. on this the criticism in Roth, 1987, 264: “It has ... proven to be necessary to separate the term autopoiesis into the two sub-aspects of production and self-preservation ...” For a further discussion of this criticism, see Section 2.1.4 my work.Google Scholar
  53. Cf. also Luhmann, 1986, 77: could one define autopoietic systems as systems that produce everything they use as a unit through what they use as a unit; and it is precisely in this that their unity consists.Google Scholar
  54. See also the following description of autopoiesis in Schmidt, 1982b, 1 f.: "‘ Autopoiesis ’defi nie rt hi insufficient‘ living system ’; - Men are auto-poetic machines, ones that are self-referential, homeostatic, autonomous, structure-determined and closed; - living system determined by its organization; they create their limits in the process of their self-creation; - Living systems equipped with nervous systems generate self-awareness through self-observation; - Categories like ‘Input’ or ‘Output’, Purpose ’, Klung’ and Time ’are categories of the observer or descriptor of a system, not of the organization of the system itself; ... - a living system is deformed both by its (independent) environment and by the system itself; ... ”Google Scholar
  55. According to Maturana, terms such as ‘Teleology’ or ‘Teleonomy’ are always descriptions made by an observer. This means that “these categories are unnecessary for an understanding of the organization of living things” (Maturana, 1982, 190). Google Scholar
  56. Cf. also characterization of the scientific method in Maturana, 1982, 136f .: “(a) observation of a phenomenon that is regarded as a phenomenon to be explained; (b) developing an explanatory hypothesis in the form of a deterministic system capable of producing a phenomenon which is isomorphic with the observed phenomenon; (c) Generation of a state or process of the system which, according to the hypothesis presented, is to be observed as a predicted phenomenon; (d) Observation of the phenomenon thus predicted. “Google Scholar
  57. Cf. also Maturana, 1982,35: “It is the circularity of its organization that turns a living system into an interaction. And it is precisely this circularity that must be maintained by the system so that it remains as a living system and can maintain its identity through various interactions. “The similarity with hermeneutics, which also presupposes the circle as constitutive for every process of cognition or understanding, cannot be overlooked. At Maturana, however, this circle does not serve to immunize against any methodological access, nor does it make empirical research impossible.Google Scholar
  58. Cf. also Maturana's characterization of evolution on the basis of the theory of autopoietic systems: “The evolutionary change in living systems is the result of that property of their circular organization which ensures the maintenance of their basic circularity, but which at the same time changes in the nature of the Preservation of this circularity allows ”(Maturana, 1982, 37). In his opinion, 'selection', in the sense of 'selecting the best adapted', is therefore not a constitutive feature of the history of evolution. See also Varela, 1984, 160f .: “... we have to say goodbye to classical thinking, which sees natural selection as the optimization of individual properties, and instead switch to a thinking that calls adaptation minimal Sees condition that must be met so that the members of a population is secured ”(emphasis in German). In (1987), Maturana / Varela prefer to speak of the ‘structural drifting’ of evolution than of the adaptation of a species. “We (Maturana / Varela, M.F.) See evolution ... as a structural drift with continuous phylogenetic selection. There is no ‘progress’ in the sense of optimizing the use of the environment, only the maintenance of adaptation and autopoiesis in a process in which the organism and the environment remain in permanent structural coupling ”(Maturana / Varela, 1987,127) .Google Scholar
  59. Maturana and Varela admit that these considerations also have ethical and political consequences, but do not initially discuss them further. Elsewhere, however, under the title Creativity and Freedom ’(Maturana, 1982, 269-271), the ethical implications of the theory of autopoietic systems are addressed. See also Maturana, 1982,79: “No scientific work should be undertaken without explicit consideration of its ethical consequences. "See also S. Beer's suggestions in Beer, 1982, 177-179. In Maturana / Varela (1987) the last pages (263–270) apply under the title: ’The knowledge of knowledge obliges’ also to address ethical issues. There the following statement, which rumor has only hypothetical character, but rather as a “fundamental (r) ontological (r) trait of the Human condition ” should apply, formulated: "We only have the world that we create together with others, and only love enables us to create this world ”(ibid., 268f.; italics i. T.). Even if this emphatic formulation is suspicious; from a sociological point of view, the statement certainly has more than a grain of truth. Unfortunately, as far as I know, such sentences are rarely found in books on biology and epistemology. In (1989) Foerster also deals with this question. There he discusses the problem of perception in the two different recognition-theoretical perspectives, on the one hand the "illustration", on the other hand the "reference". The alternative of whether we depict a world that is independent of us or whether we are always part of the universe with every act of perception is - according to Foerster - a fundamentally undecidable (in the Gödel's sense) question. Therefore mDF; you decide for yourself: "My (Foersters, M.F.) Metaphysical decision is to declare myself to be part of the universe ”(Foerster, 1989,30; italics i.T.).But this decision also implies responsibility for this world.Google Scholar
  60. Cf. also Maturana, 1982, 33: “Cognition is an ical phenomenon and can only be achieved as such. Any epistemological insight into the realm of knowledge presupposes this understanding ”Google Scholar
  61. This 'expansion' of the subject area of ​​the theory of autopoietic systems concerns the occurrence of state changes of a purely relational kind: “The nervous system ... expands the interaction area of ​​the organism by enabling it to express its internal states in a way that is relevant to it, not only through physical ones Events, but to be modified by 'pure relations' ”(Maturana, 1982,39).