Are Muslims hostile to other communities

Decisive authority

REASON

I. Facts

1. The applicant N. F. M., a national of Afghanistan, entered the federal territory illegally on January 14, 2002 and submitted his asylum application, 0201.3335-BAI, to the Federal Asylum Office on the same day.

He was questioned in writing on 02/05/2003 and 03/27/2003.

2. The Federal Asylum Office rejected the asylum application with the contested decision of March 27, 2003 in part I according to §7 AsylG 1997; In part II of the ruling it stated that the rejection, deportation or deportation of the applicant to Afghanistan according to §8 AsylG was not permissible and granted in the event that the ruling points I and II become final according to §15, paragraph 1 in conjunction with §15 Paragraph 3 AsylG 1997 a residence permit limited to 3 months.

3. An appeal was lodged against point I on April 11, 2003 in due time.

4. The Independent Federal Asylum Senate carried out an oral appeal hearing on February 16, 2005, in which the applicant took part, but not the Federal Asylum Office, which was excusedly absent.

Negotiation document

VL: Mr. N, how are you?

Mr. N: I'm fine. I am healthy.

VL: Tell me why you can't go back to Afghanistan?

Mr. N .: The commandant from whom I fled, namely A. is the security commander of N. and belongs to the Shora-e-Nazar or the Jamiat-e Islami. Besides, I've now become a Christian. I can't go back because I would be at risk there.

VL: That means there are essentially two reasons: First of all, the fear of the commanders mentioned and then the conversion to the Christian faith.

Mr. N: Yes.

VL: What exactly is your fear of the commanding officer based on?

Mr. N .: A. was a mujahideen commander. He was an enemy of our family because my father was in the army of the democratic republic. Our family was ostracized as a communist godless family. I was also at the youth organization of the VDPA myself. In 1993 the mujahideen attacked our house, killed one of my brothers and two of my brothers fled. One of them is currently in Holland and already has the citizenship of this country, I don't know about the whereabouts of the other brother. At the time of the Taliban I was imprisoned for a year, after which the mujahideen wanted to get hold of me again, because my living space was cramped, so I fled. I fled around 2002. I got confused with the dates because the Taliban have a different calendar. It was 3 months before I arrived in Austria and it was winter. At that time, the Hejiri calendar had become alien to me because the Taliban were using Arabic calendars.

VL: Were the Taliban still in power when you fled?

Mr. N: When the ISAFF forces expelled the Taliban, the prisons were opened, so I went to N., where we were at home, when the mujahideen were still looking for me, I then left the country.

VL: Can you give an exact reason why you were imprisoned by the Taliban?

Mr. N: The area of ​​N. was the border area between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. I had a grocery store there. The Taliban arrested me on suspicion of selling the food to their enemies.

VL: Why should the suspicion lead to your persecution among the Mujahideen too?

Mr. N: This hostility of the Mujahideen was based on the time of the communist regime. A. had attacked our house in 1993 and as described, one of my brothers was killed and two fled. He used to belong to the Hezb-e Islami and later to the Jamiat-e Islami. He is a powerful mujahideen and still our enemy.

VL: What was your father's role in the communist regime?

Mr. N: My father was an officer and a colonel. He was a party member of the VDPA. He also had a 6-month training in Russia. He worked in the Ministry of Defense, and my brothers were also party members.

VL: Was your father particularly prominent in any way?

Mr. N .: Even at the beginning of the revolution, when the VDPA came to power, my father was active in the N area. He has worked for the regime under the leadership of Nur Mohammed Taraki.

VL: Is there a coherent reason that A.

specifically targeted your family?

Mr. N .: The hostility was based on beliefs and my father was a party member of the VDPA, a democrat and A. was a religious person. It also comes from our area.

SV: In Afghanistan the communists are generally not persecuted. They are represented in the government and make up over 50% of the specialist civil servants in the army, in the state security service, in the Ministry of the Interior. In this regard, I would like to refer to my report on the situation of the communists under the Karzai government of November 10, 2002. However, those members of the VDPA and members of the VDPA regime are at risk groups who have killed or seriously harmed people in the course of their service or who have deeply injured their honor, for example when a woman from her family rapes her or her girls Married forcibly. Those communists also belong to the risk group who distinguished themselves after the communists came to power in 1978, organized demonstrations and obviously frowned upon the Islamic religion during these actions. Basically, the communists took actions at the time that contradicted the principles of the Islamic religion, for example alcohol consumption in public, the compulsion to unveil women and much more. If the father or the brothers of the BW in the N. region or in Kabul have seriously harmed people and the victims remember the father or brother as the perpetrator, it cannot be ruled out that the victims' feelings of revenge also affect the BW can encroach. In this case, the BW's father and brother must have taken massive action against the BW family and damaged them. If the father or the brothers of the BW live in Afghanistan, then the perpetrators can be found by the victims or on the spot and the BW does not face any risk of persecution because the perpetrators are within reach. When the perpetrators have fled, it is common for those seriously affected to hold the remaining direct family members, e.g. the BW, responsible when they are in Afghanistan. The BW indicated to the BAA that from the time of the interrogation on 00.00.2006 he fled from Afghanistan 6 months ago. According to this information, the BW should have left Afghanistan in August or September 2001, respectively. At that time the mujahideen was not in power but the Taliban. If the BW actually left Afghanistan 3 months before the first questioning on 00.00.2002, it left Afghanistan during the period when the Americans and the allies bombed Afghanistan. ISAFF was later used as an international protection force. Therefore, to the best of my knowledge of the political and military situation, the information regarding the escape time of the BW is vague. The commander A. named by BW is the district chief of District N .. This is evident from the attached excerpt from the Internet and he is not the chief of security. This study was carried out in 2002. However, after my research in Afghanistan, I know that a district chief becomes the security chief, even though both positions are appointed by the Interior Ministry. After the government, the international community and the human rights institutions pay close attention to the activities of the government agencies, a commander who is currently working for the government persecutes anyone who has not done anything to him personally. If the father or brother of the BW actually damaged A., then there would still be a reason for acts of revenge. Regarding the name of the BW, I would like to point out that, to the best of my knowledge, a name "N." is uncommon in Afghanistan. I looked into it last night and I found an article on the Internet from which I could see that "N." in connection with religions or languages ​​practiced in the Indian region. I would like to refer to a partial printout of an article and enclose the corresponding article.

VL: Do you know whether members of your family have seriously harmed someone from the field of A.?

Mr. N .: After the revolution of the 7th Saur, the communists and the Russians attacked the area of ​​N. Several people were killed, including A.'s uncle was killed in prison. Since my father was known in the area as a supporter of the government and a democrat, he has been blamed for this.

VL: Why is your father being linked to this incident?

Mr N: The opponents of the government saw all members of the VDPA as their enemies and since my father was my army with them, they blamed him for these attacks, among other things. My father took part in the front lines, but I don't think he killed people.

VL: Do family members still live in Afghanistan?

Mr. N: No, none.

VL: Which ethnic group do you belong to?

Mr. N: I am Tajike.

VL: Do you know where your father is?

Mr. N: My father lives in Pakistan with our family.

The hearing is suspended for about 15 minutes.

VL: As I see from the files, you have converted to Christianity. When exactly did you transfer?

Mr N: I had discussions with Christians already in the Netherlands. When I came to Austria, to Vorarlberg, I introduced myself to the congregation and expressed my wish to become a Christian.

VL: Can you explain why?

Mr. N: I didn't see anything good in the beginning, just Muslim radical people. I was in the Taliban prison for 1 year. That's why I didn't feel comfortable being a Muslim. Then I decided to live as a Christian. I was subsequently baptized and accepted into the Free Evangelical Church.

RV: The BW also completed a basic faith course, voluntarily.

Note: The BW submits a course script containing its handwritten notes. To prove its testimony, the BW brought 2 witnesses to the hearing.

Questioning of the witnesses:

VL: What can you say about BW, especially about his conversion to the Christian faith?

Ms. H .: The BW has come to the community. He tried very hard to establish personal contacts and sought a conversation about questions of faith. He read the Bible on his own and attended the congregation regularly. I was present at his baptism and the BW is actively involved as a Christian.

Ms. G .: I got to know BW when it came to our church for the Sunday service on the first day. I asked him what he was looking for and where he came from. He told me that he would like to get to know the Christian faith better and learn more about it.

Because he already got to know the Christian faith through Christians in Holland, but it was only brief. I offered and recommended to the BW to take a basic course. We then completed this basic course in about 3 months with the consent of our pastor and under his supervision. It was a very intense time in which we not only read the Bible, but also questioned and discussed what we had read. I was often ashamed of how we, who see ourselves as good Christians, take a lot of things very superficially. It struck me very much how much this concerned the BW and moved it to get to know Jesus Christ and also to live this faith. I was still ashamed how often I felt how he really lived Christian faith without many words and to show it publicly. After this course his wish was to be baptized and I would like to emphasize that he felt very moved and we thought for a long time whether to baptize yes or no. He told me that he was afraid that other Muslims, who are also here in Austria in Vorarlberg, could now threaten him. We also did this Bible study behind closed doors for fear that other people would notice that we were reading the Bible. After the baptism I witnessed how the BW openly told these Muslim people that they believed in Jesus Christ and he also told them about the Christian faith. After a year in which I knew the BW, within the framework of the Christian community, I invited the BW to come to my family and over the months my family grew fond of it and the BW was part of our family. That was 1 year after I got to know BW. The BW made the faith publicly known.

Note: The BW presents a confirmation of baptism. A copy of the original is made and attached to the negotiating document.

SV: Those Muslims who convert to other non-Muslim religions, such as the Christian religion, are called mortad (apostates). This conversion is not tolerated by either the Sharia or the Muslims. However, Muslims who are enlightened and have come into contact with Christians and with members of other religions take note of this change of religion. In many Islamic countries there are Jewish, Christian, Indian and other non-Muslim communities, but they have their roots there. There is no Christian tradition in Afghanistan. Attempts by individuals to build Christian churches in Afghanistan have failed. In 1972 a Christian church was founded by an Afghan who was educated in a Swiss boarding school. This was torn down at the request of the Islamic clergy on the orders of the then Prime Minister Mussa Shafik. Basically, the majority of devout and very traditionally thinking Muslims are very hostile to Muslims who leave Islam and join another religion. But that does not mean that Muslims are fundamentally against Christians as long as they respect their tradition and religion. In the case of the BW, I would like to state that, according to the documents that he has submitted, according to the statements of his witnesses, he has actually accepted the Christian faith and has made this known not only in the Christian community, but also in the Afghan community. That is, his conversion has reached a public. If the BW returns to Afghanistan and if it becomes known that he has become a Christian, he can be reported by the conservative mullahs, but also by parts of his family members if they are hostile to him. Although the establishment of religious communities is not prohibited under the new Afghan constitution, there is a risk that the conservative clergy who sit in the government, in the Supreme Court, or in other courts, will take the charges of ordinary clergy or other people seriously and cause difficulties for the BW. This is due to the fact that the central state has not yet stabilized and the laws are interpreted differently by different official bodies. Since the traditional community in particular is hostile to the conversion of a Muslim to another religion, it can happen that when the new faith of the BW becomes known in the community, from where it comes, he is harassed. This can also lead to the family of such a person, in order to protect their reputation, expelling them from the family. There is also a risk that if a fanatical family member (uncle or cousin) becomes known that they will actually attack them out of anger and seriously injure them. Such people have no choice but to leave familiar residential areas. I would also like to point out that the Afghans use every means to flee, because of the insecure situation in Afghanistan, or because of other reasons that forced him to leave Afghanistan. This is known in Afghanistan and among the Afghans, that is, only if someone says that he is a Christian, or if he has stayed with a Christian community in Europe, he does not necessarily have to be persecuted. But if someone has had his conversion to Christianity documented and has become a convinced Christian, and if this becomes known to the Afghans, there is a risk that the conversion will become known through the Afghans, as in the case of the BW, in Afghanistan. This means that there is a high probability that the BW will be exposed to the harassment mentioned above. In this regard, I would like to refer to an oral report dated February 10, 2004, GZ: 211.857 / 36-II / 06/04, which also results in the persecution of converts. According to the Sharia the killing of these people is allowed. It is not yet known in Afghanistan that anyone has been persecuted by the government or the community until now, with the exception of the Taliban period. This is due to the fact that the converts keep their religion as secret as possible out of fear. Otherwise they will also be rejected by the family. I would like to mention that Christian communities exist through communities of Europeans in Afghanistan and that members of human rights organizations have founded small chapels to practice their faith. But the Afghans accept that.For Muslims, Jesus Christ has the same status as the Prophet Mohammed.

RV: I motion for the appeal to be granted.

VL to Mr N .: Do you have anything to add?

Mr. N: No.

VL: Are there any questions for the SV?

RV: No.

Note: The investigation is closed.

5. The Federal Asylum Office was notified of the applicant's conversion with the option of commenting. However, the deadline granted for this passed unused.

II. The member of the Independent Federal Asylum Senate appointed to make a decision has considered:

1. Findings

1.1. About the applicant:

The person of the applicant has been determined on the basis of the identity card no. 0000000, issued in 1991 by IM Kabul, which was already presented in the first instance proceedings. The use of the alias name and the alias date of birth results from the incorrect information provided by the applicant on the occasion of his application for asylum on 00.00.2002 at the Federal Asylum Office, Traiskirchen branch.

The applicant is a national of Afghanistan and belongs to the Tajik ethnic group.

The appellant left Afghanistan because of feared persecution by the mujahideen because he comes from a communist family. The appellant was previously imprisoned for one year while the Taliban was in power on suspicion of selling groceries to the enemy.

He already had contact with other Christians in the Netherlands.

The applicant was baptized on 06.06.2004 in the Free Evangelical Congregation in D. in front of other worshipers and documented this publicly through his baptismal certificate in front of the church community and through the act of baptism. The conversion took place out of religious conviction.

1.2. Regarding the situation in Afghanistan it is stated:

General:

The intervention of the anti-terror alliance and the overthrow of the Taliban regime offer Afghanistan the chance of a fresh start after 23 years of civil war and armed conflict. Al Qaeda and the rest of the Taliban have been weakened in the meantime, but the fight against them is not yet over. The successful enactment of the new Afghan constitution on January 26, 2004 is a further step on the way to a permanent balance between the internal Afghan factions. The presidential elections took place on October 9, 2004. The electoral commission officially confirmed Hamid Karzai's victory on November 3, 2004. Election day passed with practically no security-related incidents. Parliamentary elections are due to be held in April 2005. The security situation for Afghan nationals has not improved nationwide, and in some respects has even deteriorated. Violent clashes between military and political rival groups continue in a number of provinces, regionally or locally, or can revive at any time. Returning there is not possible without risking life and limb. In addition to clashes between rival militias, especially in the south and east of the country, there have been increased violent attacks by regrouped Taliban forces since the summer of 2003. The anti-terror coalition is fighting the radical Islamist forces mainly in the east, south-east and south of Afghanistan with currently more than 18,000 men. After the war years and a long drought, Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. The economic situation is still desolate, but the first steps to improve the general conditions have been initiated. The humanitarian situation poses major challenges for the country, especially in view of the approximately 3.7 million refugees - mostly returned from Pakistan. Just as there is a lack of functioning administrative structures, one cannot speak of a judicial system that is only rudimentary functioning. There is no agreement on the validity and thus applicability of legal principles. In addition, there is a lack of equipment and suitable and trained personnel. The structure in the judiciary is proving to be particularly troublesome. The human rights situation is slowly improving, although it should be noted that this consideration is made against the background of a previously very low level. The situation of Afghan women is only improving slowly, even if bans against them from the Taliban era have been formally lifted. Local rulers and commanders pose the greatest threat to human rights disregard. The central government has practically no control over many of these human rights abusers. It cannot control these perpetrators, investigate their actions, or bring them to justice. The decisive factor is therefore the desired expansion of the central government's sphere of influence to include the entire country. (Source: Report of the Foreign Office in Berlin on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in Afghanistan, status: October 2004, section summary)

... it is to be stated that in reality one cannot speak of a monopoly on the use of force by the transitional government. The report of the Foreign Office explains that according to the constitution signed by President Karzai on January 26th, 2004, the monopoly on the use of force lies with the government and states that the constitution includes the classic separation of powers. This constitution, which is actually progressive and modern in many parts, in no way reflects Afghan reality. At this point it must be emphasized once again that Western observers are deceived when they transfer their own political experiences and expectations to the situation in Afghanistan. Beyond the superficial image suggested by keywords such as "democratization", "disarmament", "new constitution" or "coalition government", the forces that have determined the history of the country for centuries are still at work in Afghan society .

In different parts of the country, large and small local warlords and commanders rule, some of whom have created their own state-like institutions. In accordance with the distinctive tribal mentality, each of them believes that they are the sovereign ruler of their territory, regardless of whether this includes a city or an entire province. Traditionally, this means that such a ruler both maintains his own warriors and is responsible for the practical implementation of the law and the observance of public order; therefore maintains its own army and also carries out police duties and prisons in its own area. According to the traditional view, the "monopoly of force" lies in the hands of the respective local ruler.

Decades of civil war have resulted in the fact that all these "tribal leaders" and the Afghan parties - which by and large still correspond to the former Mujahideen factions - now have a modernly armed private army and in some cases also financially strong foreign financiers. In the areas they dominate, they de facto exercise the monopoly of force.

The president's power base lies primarily in Kabul, where he is strengthened by the approximately 6,000-strong ISAF force, and in the Pashtun areas in the south and east of the country, where 11,000 US soldiers are stationed. The non-Pashtun factions oppose this and are primarily trying to expand their political and military power, especially in the northern provinces.

For Kabul and the surrounding area, too, the question of the Karzai government's monopoly on force cannot be answered with absolute clarity: Karzai can rely on the ISAF troops, which undisputedly recognize his instructions. This means that his position of power and his ability to actually exercise state authority are much stronger here than in the provinces. So one can in principle speak of President Karzai's monopoly on the use of force in Kabul and the surrounding area. On the other hand, you have to take into account that ... his cabinet is by no means homogeneous and his opponents have the ability to influence the army, the police and the judiciary very much. In addition, there are a number of "gray eminences" in Kabul, mostly old greats from the Mujahideen period such as ex-President Rabbani or the extreme fundamentalist leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. They also have the opportunity to exert strong influence informally. If, for example, a minister from Karzai's cabinet or someone who has ties to one of the so-called coalition parties, for example, wants to use the police apparatus or the judiciary to destroy a personal or political opponent, that is entirely possible.

On the basis of the above-mentioned conditions, the "Karzai government" cannot actually establish a monopoly of force in Kabul and the surrounding area, since - as has also been extensively documented - it is not a government with a unified political will. Rather, one can speak of the president's monopoly on the use of force, supported by the international peacekeeping force, which is heavily influenced and subverted by the action of his political and military opponents. (Opinion by Dr. M. D. of July 24, 2004 for the Saxon Higher Administrative Court)

Legal and administrative system

Just as there is a lack of functioning administrative structures, so far it has not been possible to speak of a judicial system that is only partially functioning. There is no agreement on the validity and thus applicability of legal principles. In addition, there is a lack of equipment and suitable personnel. Often the texts of the most important Afghan laws are not even available. In fact, in so far as they perform their function, the courts refer to customary law and regulations of Islamic law rather than to laws that are still in force. Italy has taken the lead in the international coordination of the development of the judiciary. Supported primarily by the USA, Italy is having courts and prisons rebuilt. The Italian Coordination Office for the Justice Sector has drawn up a new Code of Criminal Procedure. It has now come into force. Despite already existing training and further education measures for judges and public prosecutors, the creation of a functioning administrative and judicial system will take several years. Despite intensive international efforts and institutional advances (such as the establishment of an independent human rights commission and its constitutional anchoring), the practically nationwide state of extensive lawlessness of the individual has not yet been overcome. It is practically visible in the large number of mostly undetected human rights violations or nationwide disputes over arbitrarily occupied private property and water sources (victims are typically Afghans abroad / returnees, there are frequent incidents in the northwest and in Kabul). After the scandal about the clearing of valuable land in the Sherpur district of Kabul at the beginning of September 2003, which was appropriated by members of the Defense Ministry, President Karzai set up a commission. It is supposed to clarify this incident and develop general solution models on how the cases of illegal land grabbing are to be dealt with. A result is not yet available. It is practically impossible to prosecute local rulers outside Kabul for assaults. In rural areas, the judge's function is usually taken over by local councils (Shuras). The case before the national security court against the former militia leader Abdullah Shah for at least twenty killings (October 2002, the execution took place on April 20, 2004, ..) was carried out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary Killings, Asma Jahangir, as not called fair. The accused had no defense counsel against his will, there had been no careful preparation for the hearing, and the hearing of witnesses had shown deficits in the procedure. The judges had made an impression that was not legally trained. Corruption is widely perceived as a major problem in the judicial and administrative sectors. (Source: Report by the Berlin Foreign Office on the situation in Afghanistan relevant to asylum and deportation, as of October 2004, Section I.3)

In Afghanistan, until Dawud took office in 1973, there was never an independent judiciary as the third power in the state. The basis of justice has always been Sharia. In 1964, King Zahir tried for the first time to create an independent judiciary with the promulgation of a new constitution, but the religious laws of Sharia continued to be the basis of this. After all, a law faculty was founded under Zahir that trained lawyers in two directions: in criminal law and for the diplomatic service. President Dawud Khan not only tried to achieve the independence of the judiciary, but also to establish a civil and criminal justice system that was not bound by religion. A modern judiciary with a prosecutor's office and a supreme court was created. In order to

however, it already attracted opposition from the traditional forces, who continued to want Sharia to be the sole source of law.

Under the "communist" regimes, an independent judiciary was formally established as the third power, although, as is not otherwise conceivable under this constellation, it operated on the political belt of the governments. Family courts were also created to protect the rights of women in disputes and divorce, as well as labor courts. In the last phase of his rule, in which he pursued a policy of reconciliation with the mujahideen, Najibullah tried to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, but also increasingly to make Islamic law the basis of justice again.

All developments towards a modern justice system were destroyed when the mujahideen came to power. From then on there could be no question of an independent judiciary; rather, an Islamic judiciary based on Sharia implemented the ideology of the ruling mujahideen in legal practice. For the rule of the Taliban, what was said above about the police force applies: All tasks that had to do with justice and jurisdiction were taken over by the "Office for the Promotion of Virtue and the Fight against Vice".

Today Italy has taken on the task of building a modern judiciary in Afghanistan. The aim is, as provided in the constitution, to establish a judicial system with a Supreme Court as the highest instance, with two instances, with civil and criminal law, family, commercial and labor courts, etc. In reality, however, this appears very problematic: on the one hand, future lawyers are only trained in crash courses and are therefore not very qualified, on the other hand, they can hardly assert themselves against the fundamentalists who dominate the justice system.

The same applies to the judiciary, as already explained above for the administrative structures and the police apparatus: Modern institutions exist on paper and functions are named that are familiar to us from Western communities. In reality, however, the various Mujahideen factions struggling for influence are everywhere at the levers of power. At the provincial level, too, what has been set out above applies analogously: In the areas in which the influence of the central government is low, the local rulers have established their own judicial organs within the state-like structures they have created, which, due to the feudal character of their rule, have no possibility to act independently. The Kabul government has little chance of getting its own personnel there. On the other hand, it is precisely in the provinces that Sharia takes precedence over the provisions of the constitution.

In addition to the question of the existence of state or quasi-state structures, the question of the existence of a functioning judicial system based on uniform principles always plays a role in asylum procedures. As in the first question, there is a kind of duplication in the judiciary: the modern judiciary, as it is described in the constitution and as the transitional government and the foreign experts want it to be, does not actually exist. On the other hand, however, there is a real functioning judicial system, both in Kabul and at the provincial level, where local rulers have created quasi-state structures and exercise power within them. In all of these structures there is agreement on both the validity and the application of legal principles. However, these are not based on written laws or the new Afghan constitution, but on the provisions of Sharia and on traditional law.

(Opinion by Dr. M. D. of July 24, 2004 for the Saxon Higher Administrative Court)

According to the report published in June 2004 by a Danish fact-finding mission to Kabul from March / April 2004, sources consulted stated that conversion from Islam to other religions is not permitted. The conversion of people from Islam to other religions is in any case threatened with the death penalty. According to the report of the US Department of State on religious freedom ex 2003, conversion from Islam to Sharia law in Afghanistan is threatened with the death penalty.In a comment on the new constitution in Afghanistan of January 29, 2004, the Christian Broadcasting Network stated that under this new constitution there is no freedom for conversion. A Muslim who converts to Christianity or any other religion would face the death penalty. (Source: UK Home Office Afghanistan Country Report October 2004 Section 6.97 bis

6.99)

"Those Muslims who convert to other, non-Muslim religions, for example the Christian religion, are called Mortad (apostates). This conversion is not tolerated by Sharia or by Muslims. However, Muslims who are enlightened and with Christians and have come into contact with members of other religions, take note of this change of religion. In many Islamic countries there are Jewish, Christian, Indian and other non-Muslim communities, but they have their roots there. In Afghanistan there is no Christian tradition. The attempts by individuals to build Christian churches in Afghanistan have failed. In 1972, a Christian church was founded by an Afghan who had been educated in a Swiss boarding school Basically the majority of the people are believers very traditionally minded Muslims are very hostile to Muslims who leave Islam and join another religion. But that does not mean that Muslims are fundamentally against Christians as long as they respect their tradition and religion. In the case of the appellant, I would like to state that according to the documents he has submitted, according to the statements of his witnesses, he has actually accepted the Christian faith and has made this known not only in the Christian community, but also in the Afghan community. This means that his conversion has reached a public. If the appellant returns to Afghanistan and if it becomes known that he has become a Christian, he can be reported by the conservative mullahs, but also by parts of his family members who are hostile to him. Although the new Afghan constitution does not prohibit the establishment of religious communities and membership in non-Muslim religious communities, there is a risk that the conservative clergy who sit in the government, in the Supreme Court or in other courts, will report simple charges Taking clergy or other people seriously and causing difficulties for the applicant.

This is due to the fact that the central state has not yet stabilized and the laws are interpreted differently by different official bodies. Since the traditional community in particular is hostile to the conversion of a Muslim to another religion, it can happen that when the new faith becomes known to the applicant in the community, where he comes from, harassment. This can also lead to the family of such a person, in order to protect their reputation, expelling them from the family.

There is also the risk that a fanatical family member (uncle or cousin), if it is known that he has converted, will attack him out of anger and seriously injure him. Such people have no choice but to leave familiar residential areas. I would also like to point out that the Afghans use every means to flee, because of the insecure situation in Afghanistan, or because of other reasons that forced him to leave Afghanistan. This is known in Afghanistan and among the Afghans, that is, only if someone says that he is a Christian, or if he has stayed with a Christian community in Europe, he does not necessarily have to be persecuted. But if someone has had his conversion to Christianity documented and has become a convinced Christian and if this becomes known to Afghans, there is a risk that the conversion will become known through the Afghans, as in the case of the appeal applicant, in Afghanistan. This means that there is a high probability that the applicant will be exposed to the harassment mentioned above. In this regard, I would like to refer to an oral report dated February 10, 2004, GZ: 211.857 / 36-II / 06/04, which also results in the persecution of converts. According to the Sharia the killing of these people is allowed. It is true that it is not known in Afghanistan that anyone has been persecuted by the government or the community until now, except during the Taliban period. This is due to the fact that the converts keep their religion as secret as possible out of fear. Otherwise they will also be rejected by the family. I would like to mention that Christian communities exist through communities of Europeans in Afghanistan and have founded small chapels with members of human rights organizations in order to be able to practice their faith. But the Afghans accept that. For the Muslims, Jesus Christ has the same status as the Prophet Mohammed. "(Source:

Expert Dr. R. in the appointment hearing on February 16, 2005)

2. Evaluation of evidence

2.1. The findings on the person of the appeal applicant result from the unobjectionable identity card No. 0000000 issued by IM Kabul in 1991. As far as the findings on conversion are concerned, these are based on the applicant's written submissions regarding his conversion (including confirmation from the Free Evangelical Congregation D. dated 00.00.2004, according to which the applicant has been visiting this congregation since December 2003, as well as Sunday church services and bible meetings held every two weeks visited), the overall conclusive and credible submission of the applicant in the oral appeal hearing on February 16, 2005, which was in accordance with the relevant witness statements (participation of the applicant in a three-month basic course, course script with handwritten notes, regular visits to meetings and church services, Notification of conversion to the Christian faith to other Muslims) is in the same negotiation.

The conversion to the Christian faith was further confirmed by the baptism confirmation presented at the hearing and the photographic material documenting the baptism ceremony.

A bogus conversion is not to be assumed - for the decisive reasons for the conversion mentioned by the appellant (one year imprisonment in a Taliban prison) in connection with the evidence that has already been recognized - rather, the appellant was able to prove that his conversion was serious intended change in religious attitudes.

As a result of the existence of a post-flight reason, a dispute with the allegations with regard to the reasons that were causal for the appeal applicant for leaving Afghanistan is irrelevant.

2.2. The statements about Christians and converts in Afghanistan result from the sources cited. These are reports from respected institutions and organizations, as well as the oral report of the expert for the political situation in Afghanistan, which are in accordance with the submissions of the applicant.

In view of the seriousness of the sources mentioned and the plausibility of the concurring statements that confirm the applicant's submissions, there is no reason for the appeal authority to doubt the accuracy of this information.

3. Legally must be stated:

According to Section 44 (1) of the Asylum Act 2003 amendment, the procedure must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Asylum Act 1997, Federal Law Gazette I No. 76/1997 in the version of Federal Law Gazette 126/2002, since the asylum application in question was filed on January 14, 2002.

According to § 7 AsylG, the authority has asylum seekers on request

Decision to grant asylum if it is credible that they im

Country of origin persecution (Art. 1

Section A Z 2 of the Geneva Refugee Convention) threatens and

none of the in Art. 1 Section C or F of

There are reasons for termination or exclusion mentioned in the Geneva Refugee Convention.

According to Art. 1 Section AZ 2 of the Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 55/1955, in the version of the Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees, Federal Law Gazette No. 78/1974, a refugee is someone who is out of well-founded fear , to be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political conviction, is located outside his home country and is unable or in view of this fear unwilling to avail himself of the protection of this country .

The central aspect of the term refugee adopted from Art 1 Section A Z 2 Geneva Refugee Convention is the well-founded fear of persecution.

A fear can only be well founded if it is objectively understandable in the light of the asylum seeker's special situation, taking into account the circumstances in the persecuting state. The question therefore is not whether a certain person is actually afraid in a specific situation, but whether a person gifted with reason would be afraid in this situation for reasons of convention. Persecution is to be understood as an unjustified intrusion of considerable intensity into the personal sphere of the individual that is to be protected. There is considerable intensity if the interference is suitable to justify the unreasonableness of claiming the protection of the home country. The danger of persecution is closely related to well-founded fear and is the point of reference for well-founded fear. There is a risk of persecution if there is a significant likelihood of persecution; the remote possibility of persecution is not sufficient. The subject of the risk of persecution is the country of origin or, in the case of stateless persons, the country of their previous habitual residence. Therefore, the risk of persecution (or the well-founded fear of it) must have existed in the entire area of ​​the home country of the asylum seeker (VwGH 9.3.1999, 98/01/0370; VwGH 14.10.1998, 98/01/262).

It emerges from the established facts that, in the event of a return to Afghanistan, the appellant has to reckon with the conduct of criminal proceedings for apostasy and participation in the spread of Christianity, whereby in view of the situation of the administration of justice in Afghanistan it cannot be assumed that that he would be able to demonstrate his innocence and face the risk of the death penalty.

Such an asylum-relevant interference in the sphere of the individual to be protected by the state leads to refugee status if it is based on a reason set out in Article 1, Section A, Number 2 of the GRC, namely race, religion, nationality, and belonging to a certain social group Group or political orientation. In the case of the applicant, the risk of persecution outlined above is due to his turning away from Islam and his conversion to Christianity.

With the credible allegation of having converted from Islam to the Christian faith, the applicant asserts a reason for after-flight. According to the judicature of the Administrative Court, these new circumstances that have arisen in Austria, with which an asylum seeker (now) justifies his fear of persecution, can in principle lead to the granting of asylum. They should therefore be examined if they are capable of justifying the assumption "well-founded fear of persecution". (e.g. VwGH 18.09.1997, 96/29/0923; 09.10.1997, 95/20/0418).

Regarding a possible domestic flight alternative, it should be noted that the well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of Art 1 Section AZ 2 of the Geneva Refugee Convention, if it is to establish refugee status, must relate to the entire national territory of the asylum seeker's home country (cf.VwGH of 8.10 1980, Coll No. 10.255 / A). If the asylum seeker is free to enter parts of his home country where he can live free from fear, and if this is reasonable for him, he does not need protection under asylum law.

Due to the Islamic law (Sharia) valid throughout Afghanistan and the Islamic jurisprudence applied in practice as well as due to the traditions existing in Afghan society and the intolerance towards religious minorities, but especially towards converts and the associated disadvantageous effects of the traditional social system as a whole Afghanistan can be assumed that the situation described above for the applicant will arise in the entire national territory of Afghanistan. Therefore, there is no domestic flight alternative.

As the result is credible that the applicant in Afghanistan is threatened with persecution within the meaning of Art. 1 Section AZ 2 GFK and no indications have emerged that one of the termination or exclusion facts mentioned in Art. 1 Section C or F of the GFK has occurred could, had to be decided according to the ruling.